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Problems of Profit Determination Encountered 
By Government Contractors
Vera B. Coulter, CPA
Just as weapon systems have grown more 
and more complex so have the provisions sur­
rounding government contracts. If the products 
being purchased by the government were those 
being used in every-day commercial activity so 
that prices and performance were well estab­
lished, all contracts could be firm-fixed price, 
and accounting problems would be little dif­
ferent from those for commercial products. 
However, much of the work done for the gov­
ernment has not been done before, making it 
impossible to estimate the costs of doing the 
work and to arrive at what both parties con­
sider a fair price on a firm-fixed-price basis at 
the time the contract is originally negotiated. 
Hence, contracts range all the way from firm- 
fixed-price to cost-plus-fixed-fee with various 
degrees of incentive provisions in between.
Whenever cost-type contracts are involved, 
the issue of what constitutes reimbursable 
costs becomes important because the contrac­
tor’s sales price depends on the costs for which 
he will receive payment. These costs are deter­
mined by the terms of the contracts and other 
regulations incorporated therein. The basic 
principles and procedures regarding contracts 
with the Department of Defense are described 
in the Armed Service Procurement Regulations 
usually referred to as ASPR. Other government 
agencies, such as the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration and the Atomic Energy 
Commission, have their own regulations as they 
do not come under the Department of Defense.
Section XV of ASPR which is entitled “Con­
tract Cost Principles and Procedures” is im­
portant to accountants dealing with govern­
ment contracts. This section states that the 
contractor will be reimbursed for direct and 
indirect costs. Direct costs are not limited to 
material and labor but are costs identified 
specifically with a contract. Thus it is permis­
sible to charge items which would normally be 
charged to overhead directly to contract costs, 
provided that like items are not charged to 
overhead and distributed to the same contract.
Indirect costs are reimbursable to the ex­
tent that they are determined to be reasonable, 
allocable and allowable in view of other factors 
set forth in ASPR. ASPR 15-201.3 states that 
“A cost is reasonable if, in its nature or amount, 
it does not exceed that which would be in­
curred by an ordinarily prudent person in the 
conduct of competitive business.” ASPR 15-
201.4 provides that “A cost is allocable if it 
is assignable or chargeable to a particular cost 
objective, such as a contract, product, product 
line, process or class of customer or activity, 
in accordance with the relative benefits re­
ceived or other equitable relationship. Subject 
to the foregoing, a cost is allocable to a govern­
ment contract if it:
(i) is incurred specifically for the contract;
(ii) benefits both the contract and other 
work, . . . and can be distributed to 
them in reasonable proportion to the 
benefits received; or
(iii) is necessary to the overall operation of 
the business, although a direct rela­
tionship to any particular cost objective 
cannot be shown.”
Among the other factors are costs specifically 
excluded, such as trade or institutional advertis­
ing, bad debts, contributions and interest or 
other financing costs. This entire section of 
ASPR is stated in rather general terms and 
there is often a difference of opinion on the 
interpretation made by the government audi­
tors and the contractor’s accountants.
Cost-type contracts may provide for reim­
bursement of actual overhead costs or negoti­
ated overhead rates. Under the negotiated 
overhead rate provisions, the contractor is re­
quired to submit an overhead claim usually 
within 90 days after the close of his fiscal 
year. This claim is then subject to audit by the 
government auditors who submit an audit re­
port stating their findings. This information be­
comes the basis for the government represent­
ative to meet with the contractor and negotiate 
a rate. It is this negotiated overhead rate that 
becomes part of the sales price of the contract. 
Since negotiations may be held anywhere from 
six months to a year after the close of the 
contractor’s fiscal year and since it may be even 
longer before a rate is agreed upon, it is easy 
to see that determining the amount of over­
head for which the contractor will be reim­
bursed can become a problem.
After the contractor has decided on the over­
head rates to use in computing his sales price, 
he still has to be concerned over how much fee 
to accrue since sales recorded under cost-type 
contracts are based on costs as incurred plus 
all allocable fees. In the case of cost-plus-fixed- 
fee (CPFF) contracts, he knows how much his 
total fee is and the problem of allocating the fee
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becomes similar to any contract where per­
centage-of-completion method is used to de­
termine gross profit. For the past several years 
many of the large contracts have been CPFF 
type of contracts. Prior to 1965, 80% of 
NASA’s business was awarded on a CPFF 
basis because of the difficulty of setting a 
firm-fixed price for such products as a capsule 
to go to the moon. Now more and more NASA 
contracts contain cost-incentive features. Cost­
incentives may be incorporated into fixed-price­
incentive contracts or cost-plus-incentive-fee 
contracts.
Cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contracts 
provide for the negotiation of a target cost, 
a target fee, a maximum fee and a minimum 
fee, and a fee adjustment formula. For instance, 
consider a contract with a target cost of $100, 
000, a target fee of $7,000, and a fee adjust­
ment formula of 80%-government and 20%- 
contractor. Assume that a maximum fee of 
$9,000 was provided and a minimum fee of 
$5,000. If the total cost is decreased from the 
target cost of $100,000 to $95,000 the con­
tractor’s fee increases 20% of $5,000 or from 
$7,000 to $8,000. This fee continues to in­
crease until cost reduction reaches $10,000, 
making costs $90,000 at which time the maxi­
mum fee will be earned and any further cost 
reduction will benefit only the government. 
Conversely, if the cost goes up to $105,000, 
the contractor’s fee will go from $7,000 to 
$6,000. By the time the cost reaches $110,000, 
the contractor will be entitled only to the 
minimum fee of $5,000 and any other cost will 
be born solely by the government. It is in­
teresting to note that once the minimum fee is 
reached a CPIF contract becomes in effect a 
CPFF contract, with the contractor receiving 
a fixed fee plus his reimbursable costs.
Under the fixed-price incentive contract, 
there is negotiated a target cost, a target profit, 
a price ceiling, but not a profit ceiling or floor, 
and a formula for establishing the final profit 
and price. This formula is based on the rela­
tionship which final negotiated total cost bears 
to total target cost. Once the price ceiling is 
reached in this type of contract, it becomes 
like a firm-fixed-price contract with any addi­
tional costs borne by the contractor.
Sharing formulas come in a wide variety and 
depend upon the contractor’s and the govern­
ment’s confidence in the target cost, the proba­
bility of overruns or underruns and the dif­
ference between target fees and maximum and 
minimum fees.
In addition to providing cost incentives, 
the government is now attempting through the 
use of weighted guidelines to establish the 
profit according to the degree of risk under­
taken by the contractor. These guidelines sug­
gest ranges for various cost elements within a 
given contract ranging from 1% to 4% for 
purchased parts and materials, to 9% to 15% 
for engineering labor. The contract negotiator 
assigns the rate he thinks most applicable and 
multiplies this rate by the target cost to arrive 
at the target profit by cost element. These tar­
get profits by cost element are then added 
together to arrive at a total target profit which 
is divided by total target cost to arrive at the 
rate. The rate is then adjusted either up or 
down depending upon the contractor’s assump­
tion of risk, his record of past performance and 
other selected factors. Once the percentage 
profit is reached, weighted guidelines add no 
additional complications to the accountant’s 
task of accruing profit.
This is not to say that there are no addi­
tional complications, for the government in its 
attempt to increase the profit motive of gov­
ernment contractors has now gone to more and 
more types of incentives. Among these is one 
created by value engineering.
Value engineering is an organized effort on 
the part of the contractor directed at achieving 
the same products, quality and performance at 
a lower cost. The value engineering clause al­
lows the contractor to retain a predetermined 
share of all cost savings resulting from the 
effort. After the cost reduction is determined 
and approved by the contracting officer, the 
target cost and fees are adjusted accordingly. 
Under incentive contracts, the contractor’s 
share of the savings may be as high as 50%. 
This means that the accountant must take these 
changes into consideration before starting to 
determine the profit to accrue.
An increasing number of contracts now have 
performance incentives. Performance incentives 
consist of such items as the following:
Performance of the Product
Range of a missile
Speed of aircraft
Thrust of an engine
Maneuverability
Fuel economy






These incentives are handled in much the 
same way as cost incentives in that a fee is 
decided upon for the various incentives. With­
in the range of acceptable achievement, addi­
tional fees are then awarded for bettering the 
goals or penalties assessed for failure to reach 
them.
(continued to page 10)
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It would be well at this time to review returns 
filed for those periods to determine that all 
elections have been validly made. Any deficien­
cies can then be remedied within the statu­
tory period.
While on the subject of elections there are 
certain statutory limitations upon related cor­
porations where controlling dates are most im­
portant. As previously stated, December 31 is 
the controlling date when apportioning the 
$25,000 surtax exemption under Section 1561 
and the multiple surtax election under Section 
1562 of the Code. In the case of the $25,000 
limitation of investment credit the apportion­
ment is as of the last day of the parent com­
pany’s tax year. On the other hand, apportion­
ment of the additional first year depreciation 
under Section 179 of the Code is based on the 
years of the members of the group ending with, 
or within, the parent’s tax year.
While the controlled corporation sections of 
the Code are of paramount importance, there 
are many other tax aspects which should be con­
sidered. The 1964 Revenue Act has given rise 
to new problems that are apt to be overlooked 
upon first exposure to the Act. One of these 
is unintentional dividends. Prior to enactment 
of Sections 1245 and 1250 of the Code it was 
common practice for related corporations to 
transfer fixed assets to one another at their 
net book value. If the fair market value of these 
assets is in excess of that value, the Treasury 
Department may adjust in accordance with the 
recapture provisions; and, at the same time, 
characterize the bargain transfer as a dividend 
over to the recipient corporation.
When purchasing used Section 38 property, 
credit may be taken up to $50,000 of the 
purchase price in any one year. In the case of 
an affiliated group (which contemplates more 
than 50% stock ownership) the $50,000 must 
be apportioned among the members of the 
group on the ratio of used property purchased 
by each, to total used property purchased by 
the group. The danger here is that if a Sub­
chapter S corporation is a member of the group 
it is frequently overlooked in the apportion­
ment calculation, because of its nontaxable 
status. This credit flows through to the indivi­
dual stockholders, but is based on apportion­
ment at corporate level.
Only a very few of the problems of related 
corporations have been touched upon here, 
but the basis of their selection is the frequency 
with which they occur, regardless of the size 
of operation. It is hoped that attention has 
been called to the necessity of the accountant 
giving thought to the many problems inherent 
in the existence of an affiliated group.
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(continued from page 4)
For instance, assume a contract for pro­






Performance 1,050 MPH 1,000 MPH 990 MPH 
Cost $80 Million $100 Million$140 Million 
Schedule 27 Months 30 Months 33 Months
Incentives
Performance $6 Million $2 Million 0
Cost 7 Million 5 Million $0 Million
Schedule 1 Million 0 Million - 1 Million
$14 Million $7 Million -$1 Million
In this case if target is achieved on every­
thing, the fee will be $7 Million. The fee could 
be increased to $14 Million if the maximums 
were reached on all incentives or fall as low as 
a negative $1 Million.
It now becomes apparent that the contractor 
may have some trade-off choices. He may have 
produced the airplane at a cost of $80 Million 
within 27 months and have achieved a per­
formance of 990 MPH, thus making him en­
titled to a fee of $8 Million. He may decide 
that by spending an additional $20 Million in 
another six months, he can increase the per­
formance to 1,050 MPH and thereby achieve 
the maximum product performance fee. In this 
case his fee would be as follows:












He would have increased his fee by $2 Million. 
The trade-off choices shown above are possible 
under the contract. However, government con­
tractors must keep foremost in mind that the 
best possible product, at the lowest cost, must 
be delivered on time.
It is easy to see that the incentives are inter­
woven and must be considered together in 
order to compute the final profit which will be 
realized on the contract. The accountant’s task 
thus becomes complex, for not only must he 
obtain engineering and production estimates of 
cost to complete the contract; but he must 
also obtain estimates of time and performance. 
Having obtained the estimates, he must review 
them before making a decision of how much 
fee to accrue.
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He is also faced with some problems in ac­
counting theory. Should he accrue a fee on 
performance because the engineers say that the 
product will reach a certain performance when 
only a final test will prove that such a perform­
ance has been achieved? Should he wait for 
the test, thereby increasing or decreasing profit 
possibly as much as a million dollars at one 
time? These are major decisions which ac­
countants can and do argue pro and con.
Having thus arrived at the fee rate to accrue 
and the costs believed to be reimbursable, the 
accountant can proceed to prepare his financial 
statements. At this point, he still has to worry 
about whether the Renegotiation Board will 
take part of it away from him.
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